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Gender-Based Employment Discrimination
in Japan and the United States
MICHAEL

I.

S. BENNETI*

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, we are surrounded by cultural affirmations
of women's successful integration into the labor market. From advertising slogans such as "You've Come a Long Way, Baby" to glossy
magazines designed for the "career woman," the popular culture suggests that American women have made great strides in the workplace.
In contrast, most Americans familiar with Japan perceive the Japanese workplace as hostile to women, with the role of women limited
to serving tea and then quitting upon marriage.
Despite these common perceptions, the situation for working women in the United States and Japan is similar in many respects. For
example, in the United States, women's wages have hovered around
65% of men's wages for the past several years,' while in Japan, the
wage differential is roughly 50%.2 Likewise, in both countries, a
much higher percentage of women than men are relegated to parttime work. 3 Furthermore, women on the average work for a shorter
period of time during their lifetimes than do men. 4 Both the American and Japanese labor forces are also highly sex-segregated, with
men holding an overwhelming majority of the highest paid jobs in
5
both societies.
* Associate, O'Melveny & Myers (New York); J.D., Columbia University School of
Law, 1990.
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2. M. SASSO, WOMEN IN THE JAPANESE WORKPLACE 11 (1990). Ms. Sasso notes that
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However, the roles of working women in the United States and
Japan are by no means perfectly equivalent. These differences are attributable to the varying historical and cultural influences in each
country. For example, in Japan, women with college degrees are
more likely to drop out of the work force during their child-rearing
years than women with only high school educations, while the opposite is true in the United States. 6 However, many factors that create
labor market inequality between the sexes are common to both
countries.
One such factor is the channeling of women into limited segments of the work force. In general, women of both countries have
primarily been employed in the relatively underpaid "helping" professions. 7 These jobs include office assistance and nursing, which are
often viewed as extensions of women's domestic responsibilities. This
systematic restriction of women's work options stems from both
deeply ingrained gender stereotypes and hostility from male workers
and male-dominated unions. Often male workers fear that if women
enter their occupations, competition for jobs will increase and the
prestige of their occupations may be devalued. 8
Another factor operating on the labor market in the two countries is that women shoulder the primary domestic and child care responsibilities. 9 In addition, the structure of the traditional work day
in the United States and Japan is based on the assumption that a
worker does not have primary domestic responsibilities.10 ConseSEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann

eds., 1986).
A similar situation exists in Japan, where, as of 1975, 64.4% of all working women were
concentrated in ten of 286 occupational catagories. Yasuo Kuwahara, OccupationalStructure
by Age and Sex in Japan, 18 JAPAN LABOR BULLETIN 5 (1979).
6. Edwards, supra note 4, at 245. See also SAsso, supra note 2, at 35. Japanese women
and their families have traditionally "looked upon higher education as a means to obtain a
better lifestyle, not through career, but rather through meeting and marrying a man with
bright prospects of becoming an executive in a large company." Id.
7. UPHAM, supra note 3, at 127-28; Kuwahara, supra note 5, at 7-8.
8. UPHAM, supra note 3, at 127-29.
9. See generally Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equalityfor Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979).
10. "The labor force is organized as if workers do not have family responsibilities. The
traditional work schedule is both too inflexible and too long for a parent with child care responsibility." Id at 56.
This situation is even more extreme in Japan, where large companies expect their employees to regularly work overtime, frequently socialize with co-workers after working hours, and
relocate on short notice. See, e.g., PETER TASKER, THE JAPANESE 92 (1987); BOYE DE
MENTE, How TO Do BUSINESS wrrH THE JAPANESE 25-55 (1987). See also Machiko Osawa,
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quently, women with children in both countries are unable to participate equally with men in the labor market, because they must find
ways to reconcile their jobs with their duties at home. Often the ac-

comodations they are forced to make include working only part-time
or leaving the work force for extended periods of time."
Thus, despite significant cultural differences between the United
States and Japan regarding the role of women in the workplace,
American and Japanese working women share much in common.
However, the legal response of the two countries to gender-based inequality in the workplace has been quite different. This Article will
examine the legal processes utilized in the United States and Japan for
sex discrimination complaints stemming from the workplace. In addition, this Article will compare the two system's operative definitions
of "sex discrimination."
II.

THE LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN

The United States' primary source of employment discrimination
doctrine is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 as amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"). Under Title VII, any employer with more than fifteen employees t3 who discriminates on the
basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin commits an

unlawful employment practice. 14 Furthermore, the statute created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), an inWorking Mothers: ChangingPatternsof Employment and Fertility in Japan, 36 ECON. DEV. &
623 (1988).
11. In the United States, approximately one-third of all working mothers work part-time.
Frug, supra note 9, at 57. "Although part-time work allows women the time and flexibility
they need to fulfill their family duties, it is dramatically underpaid in comparison with fulltime employment. Moreover, it is characterized by inadequate fringe benefits or credits toward promotion, tenure, or salary adjustments." Id.
In Japan, 80% of part-time workers are women. Part-time workers generally receive onehalf to three-fourths of the wages and 20% of the bonuses of full-time workers. Jan M. Bergeson & Kaoru Yamamoto Oba, Japan's New Equal Employment Opportunity Law: Real
Weapon or Heirloom Sword?, 1986 B.Y. L. REv. 865, 874 n.51 (1986).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-/2000aa-12 (1991).
13. The statute was originally limited to employers with more than twenty-five employees, but the number was reduced to fifteen by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
14. Title VII also makes it unlawful for a labor organization or employment agency to
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. However this Article focuses only on genderbased discrimination.
CULTURAL CHANGE
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dependent federal agency responsible for investigating employment
5
discrimination complaints.'
Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, other
sources of law may apply in addition to, or instead of, Title VII to
combat employment discrimination. These sources include the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 1 6 and the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 7 which

have been interpreted to prohibit discrimination in government employment; the Equal Pay Act of 1963,18 which requires equal pay for
equal work without regard to gender; the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978,19 which prohibits discrimination against pregnant wo-

men in the workplace; Presidential Executive Order 11246, which forbids discrimination by federal contractors;

state and local fair

employment practice laws, which are often more comprehensive than
Title VII;20 and collective bargaining agreements, many of which con-

tain anti-discrimination provisions. 2'

In practice, however, these alternate sources of anti-discrimina-

tion law are of limited use against gender-based discrimination in employment. The constitutional provisions, for example, can only be
invoked against a government employer. Moreover, since the United
15. In the area of gender-based discrimination, the EEOC operates as follows: The Commission's regional field offices receive written complaints of employment discrimination under
either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. The complaints may be made against public or private
employers, labor organizations, or public or private employment agencies. Charges generally
must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation, and the EEOC must
notify the persons charged within ten days of receiving the complaint. The EEOC will then
investigate the complaint, and, if there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, it will
attempt to remedy the problem by means of conciliation, conference or persuasion. If an acceptable agreement is not reached by those informal means, the EEOC may bring suit in an
appropriate federal district court or encourage the complaining party to do so. See JAMES E.
JONES, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 13-15

(5th ed. 1987).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. The Equal Pay Act is Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d).
19. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 was passed as an amendment to Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
20. For example, while Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, state laws often cover all employers. Many state laws also cover additional categories of
discrimination, such as handicap, marital status and arrest record. See JONES, supra note 15,
at 10.
21. A 1973-1974 Bureau of National Affairs survey showed that 69% of collective bargaining agreements contain provisions that prohibit discrimination by the employer or union
on the basis of race, creed, gender, national origin or age. Id. at 11.
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States Supreme Court has declared gender to be a "non-suspect classification," ' 22 these constitutional clauses are not as effective against
gender-based discrimination as they are against race discrimination.
Likewise, the Equal Pay Act may only be invoked in a limited set of
circumstances, such as when an employer pays female and male employees unequally for precisely the same job. 23 Because the work
force in the United States is highly gender-segregated, with companies
often hiring women in low-paying jobs in which no men are employed, the Equal Pay Act provides no relief for the many women
who hold historically undervalued "women's jobs."'24
Similarly, Japanese law contains several sources of anti-employment discrimination doctrine. Article Fourteen of the Japanese Constitution prohibits discrimination in political, economic, and social
relations based on race, creed, gender, social status, or family origin. 25
Despite its broad language, the Japanese courts have interpreted this
article to require state action. 26 Therefore, a party cannot bring an
action for discrimination by private employers directly under Article
Fourteen of the Constitution.
Another source of anti-employment discrimination law is the Labor Standards Act. 27 This Act addresses all aspects of the employeremployee relationship, and applies to private employers, 28 but it provides only limited protection to female workers. Although Article
Four of the statute contains the principle of equal pay for equal
22.

Constitutional doctrine in the United States provides that a state government may use

most criteria for classifying people as long as the classification is rationally related to a permissible state policy. This standard of review is known as the "rational relation" test. Certain

classifications, however, such as classifications based on race, are considered inherently "suspect," and are held to a higher standard known as "strict scrutiny." Under strict scrutiny, a

classification will only be upheld if it is necessary to accomplish a compelling state purpose.
Classifications based on gender are not considered "suspect classifications" and do not

receive strict scrutiny. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
gender classifications should be put to an "intermediate" standard of review, in between strict
scrutiny and the rational relation test. To be allowed, a classification based on gender "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 197.
23. JONES, supra note 15, at 13.
24. Weiler, supra note 3, at 1779.
25. KENI'6 [Constitution] art. XIV (Japan).
26. See UPHAM, supra note 3, at 130. The Japanese Supreme Court definitively held that
Article Fourteen of the Constitution does not directly apply to private parties in Takano v.
Mitsubishi Plastics Co., 27 Minshi 1536, 1556 (Dec. 12, 1973).
27. Rodo Kijunho, Law No. 49, 1947 (formerly art. 61) [hereinafter Labor Standards
Act].
28. The Act applies to all employers except those that only employ domestic servants or
family members who live together. Labor Standards Act, art. 8.
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work, 29 its effectiveness is limited by the high degree of gender-segregation in the Japanese work force, as well as the minimal recognition
of the concept of comparable worth. 30 Moreover, Article Three, the
broadest provision of the Act prohibiting discrimination in wages,
working hours, and other conditions of employment, does not address
gender-based discrimination. 31 Instead, it only applies to discrimination on the basis of nationality, creed, or social status. 32
Furthermore, the Labor Standards Act originally contained a
number of protective provisions which were detrimental to a woman's
advancement in the workplace. These provisions restricted women
from engaging in most overtime and nighttime work, and from working in certain areas that were considered to be dangerous or overly
strenuous. With regard to overtime, for example, women were restricted to a maximum of two hours of overtime work per day, six
hours of overtime work per week, and one hundred fifty hours of
overtime work per year, with all holiday work prohibited. 33 Since
most management-level employees were regularly required to work
long overtime hours, these protective measures limited women's ability to gain managerial positions in most companies. 34 Many of these
protective provisions, however, were eliminated or relaxed by the Labor Standards Act Amendment of 1985. 35
The Japanese Civil Code also contains anti-discrimination provisions. Two provisions are significant in this regard. First, Article 129. "The employer shall not discriminate women against men concerning wages by reason of the worker being a woman." Labor Standards Act, art. 4.
Article Four has only once been the basis of a successful court challenge of an employment practice. In Nawataya v. Akita Sogo Bank Case, 321 HANTA 162 (Akita D. Ct. April
10, 1975), a female employee sued her employer because of its discriminatory wage system.
Under the system, employees with dependents recieved a higher wage. All men, regardless of
whether they actually had dependents, were paid at this higher rate, and all women were
automatically assigned the lower rate.
30. "Apart from the case of youths initially hired on the same terms, the Japanese law
appears to have had a minimal impact, because the wage gap between women and men has
been exacerbated by the designation of different titles for identical jobs." SAsso, supra note 2,
at 19.
31. Labor Standards Act, art. 3.
32. Id.
33. See generally Labor Standards Act.
34. See SASSO, supra note 2, at 17.
35. See The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 6 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 4.01
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1991). With regard to overtime, the amendment, which was passed in
conjunction with the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, removed all overtime work restrictions for women in managerial, professional, and technical positions and greatly increased the
maximum number of overtime hours for women in other fields.
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states that the Code should be interpreted to reflect the dignity of
individuals and the essential equality of the sexes. Second, Article
9037 provides that any juristic act contrary to public policy and good
morals is null and void. Because judges turn to the Constitution as a
guide when determining public policies, Article 90 provides a way in
which Article Fourteen of the Constitution, prohibiting sex discrimination, may be utilized against private employers. 38
These provisions have been the bases of a number of lawsuits by
women challenging alleged discriminatory practices. However, the
potential scope of the employment practices that may be attacked
under Article 90 is somewhat limited, because Japanese courts have
consistently held that only overt acts of "unreasonable discrimina236

tion" violate public policy. 39 Moreover, since Article 90 applies only

to "juristic acts," certain employment practices by private employers
have been deemed to be unreviewable under the Civil Code. 4° Discriminatory employment advertising is not, for example, considered a
juristic act, as it possesses no legal effect. 41
In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1985
("EEOA") 42 establishes guidelines for employers. The guidelines
state that employers "shall endeavor" not to discriminate in terms of
recruiting, hiring, assigning, and promoting employees. 43 Further,
employers "shall not" discriminate in terms of training and benefits. 44
36. UPHAM, supra note 3, at 130.
37. Id.
38. Oki v. Nagoya Broadcasting Co., 756 HANJn 56, 58 (Nagoya High Ct. Sept. 30, 1974),
illustrates the way in which judges can use Article 90 of the Civil Code to bring the weight of
Article 14 of the Constitution to bear against private employers. The court stated,
The legal system of Japan with the Constitution at the top intends to forbid any
unreasonable discrimination based on sex, for the purpose of realizing the essential
equality of the sexes. These principles are stipulated in Article 14 of the Constitution
as to the relations between the state or public organizations and individuals, and in
Article 1-2 of the Civil Code as to relations between two or more individuals, and the
prohibition of such discrimination is in accordance with public policy. Thus, conspicuously unreasonable sexual discrimination shall be invalid as violating public policy under Article 90 of the Civil Code.
Id.
39. UPHAM, supra note 3, at 132-133.
40. Id.
41. See Kuwahara, supra note 5, § 4.03.
42. Koyo no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no Kakuho to Joshi
Rodosha no Fukushi no Zoshin ni kansuru Horitsu (Law No. 45, 1985), passed as an amendment to the Working Women's Welfare Law (Kinro Fujin Fukushiho), Law No. 113, 1972.
43. Loraine Parkinson, Japan'sEqual Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 604, 607 (1989).

44. Bergeson, supra note 11, at 875.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J[
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The difference between the two standards is unclear, because the
EEOA as a whole requires only voluntary compliance by employers
and does not provide any penalities for non-compliance. However,
the EEOA provides that the Ministry of Labor may issue additional
guidelines in the future. 45 Perhaps these different standards suggest
that the Ministry will put particular effort into eliminating discrimination in training and benefits.
The EEOA also established a three-tier grievance procedure.
First, an employee experiencing discrimination must use the complaint resolution mechanisms established by her employer.4 Second,
if this process proves inadequate, she may ask the prefectural office of
the Ministry of Labor to assist in resolving the dispute. 47 Finally, and
only if both the employer and the employee agree, an Equal Employment Opportunity Mediation Commission4" may mediate the complaint. 49 The Commission, however, has no binding authority over
the parties, and may only draft proposed settlements and recommend
their acceptance.50
III.

LITIGATION AND MEDIATION IN THE Two SYSTEMS

In both the United States and Japan, employment discrimination
law is enforced by litigation and bureaucratically-controlled, nonbinding mediation. However, the two legal systems place differing
emphases on these enforcement mechanisms.
In the United States, a woman who files an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must first file her complaint with the
EEOC. 51 The claimant then waits for the EEOC to respond before
commencing private legal action. 52 Because the EEOC has no in45. Parkinson, supra note 43, at 610.
46. Article 13 of the EEOA provides that employers should create a labor-management
body within their companies to deal with discrimination complaints. See UPHAM, supra note
3, at 153.
47. Article 14 of the EEOA states that the director of the prefectural Women and Minor's Office may render necessary advice, guidance or recommendations if requested by either
or both sides. See id.
48. Article 16 of the EEOA created these commissions. Parkinson, supra note 43, at 607.
49. A Commission consists of three non-lawyers chosen from the local community.
However, the mediation provisions of the EEOA may not be used to challenge recruitment or
hiring practices. See Bergeson & Yamamoto Oba, supra note 11, at 873.
50. UPHAM, supra note 3, at 153.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(G) (1974); see also Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of.1964: A Decadeof PrivateEnforcement and JudicialDevelopments, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J.
225, 231 (1976).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1974); see also Belton, supra note 51, at 231.
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dependent enforcement authority,53 the process may be viewed as a
roadblock to effective private enforcement.
Historically, though, the EEOC has not been a hurdle to the enforcement of employment discrimination law. Rather, the Commission has been an active ally of grievants, often strengthening their
cases through the EEOC investigation process.5 4 In addition, the
EEOC encourages private litigation upon finding evidence of a violation, which it cannot correct by means of its statutorily defined powers of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 55 The EEOC also has
56
the power to bring suits in federal court on behalf of private parties.
Furthermore, because the EEOC's investigation and conciliation procedures are enhanced by a significant threat of litigation, it has the
power to exert pressure on employers to cure violations.
Hence, the required mediation procedure in the United States
does not obscure the importance of litigation. In fact, the initial mediation process built into Title VII centers around the vindication of
legally enforceable rights and the threat of court action. Additionally,
the emphasis of anti-discrimination law is placed squarely on enforcement through the court system.
In contrast, Japanese employment discrimination law, with the
enactment of the EEOA, places primary emphasis on mediation
rather than litigation. Although the EEOA retains a female worker's
right to challenge an alleged discriminatory practice in court, the
three-tiered mediation procedure created by the statute may deemphasize legal rights 57 and channel potential litigants away from the
court system. For example, the EEOA delegated primary responsibil53. Unlike the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), which has administrative
enforcement authority, the EEOC is a comparatively "weak" agency. When Title VII was
passed in 1964, Professor Michael Sovern called the EEOC a "poor, feebled thing [with] power
to conciliate but not to compel." See MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205 (1966).

54. "Far from inhibiting private litigation.., the passage of Title VII and the creation of
the EEOC established a partnership between private litigants and EEOC officials that accelerated the pace and significance of private antidiscrimination litigation." UPHAM, supra note 3,
at 163.
55. Id.
56. Originally, the EEOC did not have the power to bring its own suits, but that authority was granted to the Commission by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1982). The only exception is suits against state or local authorities, which
may not be brought directly by the EEOC, but which the EEOC may refer to the Justice
Department for enforcement. See generally JONES, supra note 15, at 7.
57. The Equal Employment Opportunity Mediation Commissions created by the EEOA
are composed of three non-lawyers, whereas the typical bureaucratic commission in Japan
consists of one judge and two non-lawyers. "There is no assurance that the commissioners will
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ity for dealing with discriminatory employment practices first to the
employer and then to the bureaucracy, while creating no new causes
58
of action.
The converse emphasis of employment discrimination law in the
United States and Japan appears to validate the prevailing stereotypes
concerning the litigiousness of the two societies. Briefly, such stereotypes include the notion that Americans view all disputes in terms of
legal rights enforceable in a court of law, while the Japanese dislike
open confrontation and consider mediation the preferable method of
resolving conflicts.
A culturally-based explanation for the differing litigation rates in
the United States and Japan is comprehensively discussed elsewhere, 59
making it unnecessary to re-open that debate in this Article. Without
disregarding the notion that much of the difference between employment discrimination law in the United States and Japan may be
rooted in cultural factors, it is noteworthy that in developing the legal
system the governments of both countries were acting in different
political contexts. Consequently, the choices made in the two countries with regard to employment discrimination laws reflect these
political factors as well as cultural preferences.
The primary source of anti-employment discrimination law in
the United States, Title VII, is a product of the extended struggle by
civil rights advocates in the early 1960s to bring discriminatory pracconsider the law, even if just as a guideline, in making their decisions." Bergeson & Yamamoto Oba, supra note 11, at 882.
58. Unlike Title VII, the EEOA does not require a complaint to be filed with a bureaucratic agency before a court action can be brought. However, judges may be hesistant to apply
an Article 90 analysis to areas covered by the EEOA. See UPHAM, supra note 3, at 154.
59. For a cultural explanation of the emphasis on mediation over litigation in the Japanese legal system, see Yasuhei Taniguchi, Dispute Settlement Framework in I DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN §§ 12.01-12.02 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1991); Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute
Resolution in ContemporaryJapan, in LAW IN JAPAN (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963);
Chin Kim & Craig M. Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The TraditionalJapaneseConception of Law, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 491 (1979).
This generalization is discussed and critiqued by Professor Haley, who argues that institutional barriers to litigation in Japan, such as the lack of access to the court system and the
intentionally inadequate number of lawyers and judges, are the primary reasons for Japan's
relatively low litigation rate. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the ReluctantLitigant,4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978). See also J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality
and Disputes in Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988); Robert J. Smith, Lawyers Litigiousness, and the Law in Japan, 11 CORNELL L. F. 53 (1984).
The degree to which the generalization is correct for the United States is discussed in
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983).
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tices under federal jurisdiction. 6o Many state governments were perceived to be indifferent about protecting minority groups from
discrimination by private parties. Thus, proponents of civil rights legislation, such as Title VII, believed that the federal government had to
intervene against private discrimination in order to protect minority
61
groups.

This desire to federalize the area of employment discrimination
was not, however, equivalent to a desire to make litigation in federal
court the primary mechanism of enforcement. Many original proponents of a federal employment discrimination statute strongly criticized the congressional act, precisely because they believed that Title
VII overemphasized litigation.62 The proponents hoped the act would
create a federal agency with extensive administrative enforcement
powers so that the purposes of Title VII could be accomplished more
efficiently than by private lawsuits. Many of proponents derided the
new commission as a "toothless tiger,"163 because it had no binding
authority. In fact, many commentators believed that Title VII's primary emphasis on litigation was evidence of the civil rights movement's defeat caused by too many Democratic compromises in
Congress. 64
Thus, the history behind the enactment of Title VII does not support the generalization that Americans consistently believe that the
court system is the most effective forum for resolving disputes. In
actuality, the importance that the statute places on litigation as an
enforcement mechanism may have been a political victory for certain
conservatives who opposed federalizing this area of the law, and believed that an emphasis on private lawsuits could minimize the legislation's effectiveness. 65
60. See generally Belton, supra note 51.
61. Id.
62. "It seems questionable that much can be accomplished through suits in federal court
by persons aggrieved by acts of discrimination. The practical advantages will lie heavily with
the defendants, and even where the evidence of discrimination is overwhelming, it cannot be
expected that many complainants will undertake the burden of an individual suit." Richard
K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L.
REv. 62, 96-97 (1965); See also Belton, supra note 51, at 227.
63. Belton, supra note 51, at 227.
64. See SOVERN, supra note 53, at 205; Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97; ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 57-58 (1971).
65. The bill, as it was originally reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, called
for the creation of a federal agency, patterned after the National Labor Relations Board, to
deal with employment discrimination. The agency was to be composed of an administrator
and a five-member board, and was to be empowered to issue cease and desist orders which

160
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Likewise, the emphasis on mediation in the Japanese system
evolved as much from political motivations as from cultural preferences. 66 The enactment of the EEOA may be seen as part of a general
governmental policy of attempting to remove social problems from
the court system, and, instead, deal with the problems through bu67
reaucratically-controlled processes.

Since the mid-1960s, private litigation of gender-based discrimination in employment claims proceeded at a fairly steady pace.68
Although judicial reluctance to extend the'scope of Article 90 of the
Civil Code beyond unreasonable and overt gender-based policies limited the scope of such litigation, the ruling Japanese Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") may have desired to remove the issue from the
court system before more of extensive legal norms against sex discrimination could develop. 69
The desire to channel employment discrimination disputes into a
would be factually conclusive if later reviewed by a court. However, much of the power of the
agency was compromised in order to avoid a Republican filibuster in the Senate, and the burden of enforcement was placed almost entirely on private litigation. See Timothy Lionel Jenkins, Study of FederalEffort to End Job Bias: A History, A Status Report, and A Prognosis, 14
How. L.J. 259, 279 (1968).
66. ALICE H. COOK & HIROKO HAYASHI, WORKING WOMEN IN JAPAN: DISCRIMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND REFORM 35 (1980).

67. "There seems little doubt that the EEOA is part of a government attempt to follow
the time-honored Japanese pattern of dealing with social conflict by simultaneously ameliorating its causes and incorporating the antagonists into government-controlled mediation machinery." UPHAM, supra note 3, at 163.

68. For a comprehensive discussion of the course of private litigation in the 1960s and
1970's, see Catherine W. Brown, JapaneseApproaches to Equal Rights for Women: The Legal
Framework, 12 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 29 (1979); COOK, supra note 66.
69. It has been suggested that the primary motivation behind the enactment of the EEOA
was the United Nations' declaration of 1976-1985 as the "Decade of Women," and by Japan's
pledge to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women ("Convention on Sex Discrimination") by 1985. See UPHAM, supra note 3, at 151; see
also Parkinson, supra note 43. This argument is not, however, entirely persuasive.
The Convention on Sex Discrimination has been ratified with more reservations than any
other United Nations human rights document. Twenty of the eighty-nine countries which
have ratified the Convention made reservations, with a total of more than eighty substantive
reservations among them. For example, Egypt and Bangladesh both ratified the Convention
but reserved the right not to impose any rules that are contrary to Islamic Law. This reservation was allowed even though it gives those two countries tremendous latitude in determining
the degree of gender-based discrimination that is permissible. CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1987). Japan, likewise, could have
ratified the Convention with reservations based on their own cultural values. Id
Furthermore, although there was no great public outcry for a new equal employment law,
the idea had been pushed for some time in the Diet by several of the opposition parties. In
1978, for example, the Japanese Socialist Party presented a "Bill Concerning the Promotion of
the Equal Treatment of Men and Women Workers," which was shelved by the LDP. See
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non-binding, bureaucratically-controlled process does not necessarily
imply that the LDP is completely hostile to women's rights.
Although the EEOA's reliance on mediation and administrative gui-

dance by the Ministry of Labor may lead most American observers to
believe the Act is ineffective, the procedure could effect some important changes provided that the Ministry adopts, as one of its primary
goals, reduction or eradication of gender-based discrimination in employment.70 The LDP may have chosen to enact legislation with

fairly weak enforcement provisions not as a means to prevent change
in this area entirely, but simply to maintain bureaucratic control over
the speed and scope of the changes.
The LDP is interested in regulating the course of change in the
area of gender-based discrimination laws because the gender inequalities in the current employment system are perceived to be advantageous for the Japanese economy. 7' The employment system that has

facilitated Japan's tremendous economic growth since World War II
is highlighted by two factors: (1) a high degree of employee loyalty to
the company, including the willingness to work overtime regularly
and relocate on short notice, and (2) lifetime employment for full-time
workers.

72

Both of these factors are made possible by women's role in the
economy. For example, when a married woman assumes all the primary housekeeping and child-care responsibilities, her husband may
easily commit himself to his company completely. Moreover, women
form a secondary labor pool for Japanese business; part-time workers
who can be easily hired during up-cycles and fired during down-cycles. This supply of women's labor, although at the woman's expense,
Brown, supra note 68, at 31. The LDP may have wanted to take preemptive action before
greater pressure for a strong statute could be generated by the opposition parties.
70. "[T]he effectiveness of the law will depend on both the willingness and the ability of
the Ministry of Labor to apply sanctions to non-cooperating firms. That is, even though direct
legal enforcement is not an option, the Ministry of Labor can create administrative or other
burdens for firms that do not comply with the law, and award extra-legal benefits to firms that
do comply." Edwards, supra note 4, at 244. See also Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of
Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 923 (1984).
71. See generally Edwards, supra note 4; Parkinson, supra note 43.
72. This description of the employment system applies only to the larger Japanese companies. Smaller firms are rarely able to guarantee lifetime employment for their workers and it
is estimated that fewer than 25% of all Japanese employers enjoy the benefits of liftime employment. Fumito Komiya, Dismissal Procedures and Termination Benefits in Japan, 12
COMp. LAB. L.J. 151, 152 (Winter 1991). For an interesting look at the Japanese employment
system, see JON P. ALSTON, THE AMERICAN SAMURAI 223-55 (1986).
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allows companies to make lifetime commitments to their full-time employees regardless of short-term business conditions.3
The reaction of many Japanese companies to the recent downturn of the country's economy illustrates the way that women workers function as a secondary labor pool. While Japan's economy
boomed during the 1980s, many companies began to hire women in
record numbers. 74 The women who entered the labor force during
these boom years included mothers re-entering the workforce as parttime workers after their children reached school age as well as recent
school graduates. 75 Now, however, with the Japanese economy
slumping and companies triming their workforces, women are bearing
the brunt of the cutbacks.76 Female part-time workers have been the
first to be let go in most company workforce reductions and even women graduates from the top universities in the country are finding
77
their career opportunities shrinking dramatically.
In short, the LDP and its business constituents prefer not to see
any sudden, wrenching changes made to the employment system. By
railing employment discrimination suits into a system of informal,
case-by-case mediation, it is highly unlikely that any new legal standards will emerge to challenge the status quo in the area of employment discrimination.78
Thus, the stereotypes concerning the contrasting litigiousness of
the Americans and the Japanese may not completely account for the
different emphases on litigation and mediation in the two systems.
Political factors also motivated the differing emphases of employe73. See Edwards, supra note 4, at 249.
74. David E Sanger, Women in Japan Job Market Find the Door Closing Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1992, at Al.
75. Id.
76. See id; Women GraduatesDraw Short Straw, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 12, 1992, at 21;
Facing Tough Times; Companies Cut Recruitment, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 26, 1992, at 12; Jon
Woronoff, Discrimination Remains at Work in Japan, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Oct. 14,
1991, at 15.
77. In 1992 there were 2.22 job openings for every male graduate seeking a position, and
0.93 job openings for every female graduate. Women Graduates,supra note 76, at 21. In 1992,
10% or more of the applications from college seniors to three of Japan's largest and most
prestigious trading companies, Mitsubishi, Itochu and Nissho Iwai, were from women. Mitsubishi hired four women and 213 men, Itochu hired five women and 198 men and Nissho Iwai
hired three women and 127 men. Sanger, supra note 74, at AIO.
78. For a discussion of the tendency of Japanese elites to view litigation as a threat to the
social and political status quo, see UPHAM, supra note 3, at 16; J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of
the ConsensualMyth: Antitrust Enforcement and InstitutionalBarriers to Litigation in Japan,
94 YALE L.J. 604 (1985).
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ment discrimination law in the two nations.79 However, different cultural attitudes about the function of law in society placed different
parameters on the types of choices that were available to the two governments.80 For example, in 1964, it was highly unlikely that the
United States Congress would have passed legislation like the Japanese EEOA, which was enforced only by non-binding mediation. An
act like the EEOA would almost certainly have appeared to be too
weak for the Americans in light of the historical context.81 The Japanese, on the other hand, were more accustomed to resolving disputes
through informal compromise, and may even have been wary of strict
legal rules in areas where no societal consensus had clearly emerged.8 2
A mediation-centered statute was, therefore, a permissible option for
the Japanese government.
IV.

WHAT CONSTITUTES "DISCRIMINATION"
IN THE Two SYSTEMS?

Laws in both the United States and Japan refer to the term "discrimination in employment" without ever defining precisely what is
meant by the term. This lack of a clear definition creates a high degree of uncertainty in the administration of employment discrimination statutes. Although in both countries certain employment
practices are unambiguously known to be discriminatory, judges and
others who are interpreting the laws often have a great deal of discretion in determining whether a particular act constitutes unlawful
83
discrimination.
The problem is particularly acute in Japan. Because the Japanese civil law system does not recognize previous case precedents as
binding on later decisions, 4 it is difficult for Japanese courts to de79. Kim & Lawson, supra note 59, at 493.
80. Ramseyer, supra note 78, at 607.
81. In 1964, the civil rights advocates, who criticized Title VII for placing the burden of
enforcement on private litigation, did not argue that enforcement based on informal compromise and non-binding mediation would be preferable. Rather, what they had hoped for, a
strong administrative agency with enforcement power, would, like a court, have based its decisions on binding legal rules. For a defense of the traditional American trust in legal rules over
informal compromise, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
82. Regardless of whether this acceptance of informality is something innate in the Japanese culture, or something that has been imposed by elite groups eager to maintain their control, the value of informal processes over binding legal rules appears to be generally accepted in
Japanese society. For a discussion of Japan's legal informality and the "culture of consensus,"
see UPHAM, supra note 3, at 205-21.
83. Cook, supra note 66, at 22.
84. Id. at 36-37.
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velop a uniform definition of discrimination. Thus, a practice declared discriminatory by one court may not be so declared by another.
This difficulty is mitigated to some extent by the tendency of Japanese
judges to follow, to an extent, major earlier decisions in a given area
of the law. 85 This unofficial and non-binding variation of stare decisis,
however, has failed to produce a consistent definition of discrimina86
tory employment.
The leading case in the area of sex discrimination in employment
is Suzuki v. Sumitomo Cement Co. ("Sumitomo Cement"),8 7 which
was decided in 1966. The plaintiff in this case was a female employee
who challenged the legality of the company's policy of requiring women workers to retire upon marriage.8 8 Relying on Article 90 of the
Civil Code, the Tokyo District Court held that "unreasonable" discrimination based on gender is contrary to public policy, and invalidated the company's retirement system on those grounds.8 9 Although

Sumitomo Cement is not cited in later opinions, the "unreasonable
discrimination" standard articulated in this case has generally been
adopted by Japanese courts to analyze explicitly sex-based employment practices.
The Sumitomo Cement decision did not, however, provide courts

with a uniform definition of discrimination. Because a company may
treat its female employees differently than its male employees as long
as the policy is reasonable in the mind of the judge hearing the case, 9°
85. For the proclivity of Japanese courts to pattern their reasoning in a case after a leading decision, see Brown, supra note 68, at 34. See also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION 47 (2d ed. 1985). In discussing the general characteristics of most civil law
systems, Professor Merryman writes, "Although there is no formal rule of stare decisis, the
practice is for judges to be influenced by prior decisions... A lawyer preparing a case searches
for cases on point and uses them in his argument; and the judge deciding a case often refers to
prior cases." Id.
86. "[R]adically divergent attitudes toward women exist in Japan today; what seems
"reasonable" to one employer or court may not seem so to others. Although most courts have
found sex-based employment systems unreasonable, the standard still involves the risk that an
idiosyncratic decision will be rendered, and the courts are still a long way from the goal of
developing consistent forms of analysis that could lessen the possibilities of inconsistent results." Brown, supra note 68, at 51.
87. 17 ROSHO 1407 (Tokyo D. Ct. Dec. 20, 1966).
88. Brown, supra note 68, at 32; Bergeson, supra note 11, at 870.
89. In evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's policy, the court considered evidence supplied by the company that women were inefficient workers and that a seniority-based
wage system required early retirement for female employees. The court held that the evidence
did not sufficiently prove that all women workers become inefficient after marriage, and ruled
that the plaintiff was entitled to a new employment contract and back wages. See Brown,
supra note 68, at 33.
90. Brown, supra note 68, at 32-33.
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the particular facts of each case must be examined. Ultimately, the
determination of whether the practice meets the reasonableness standard and, thus, is acceptable under Article 90 depends on a judge's
own view of public policy and good morals. The Sumitomo Cement
doctrine, therefore, is no guarantee that employment policies will be
evaluated consistently throughout the court system.
For example, in Karatsu v. Red Cross Hosptial,91 the Saga District Court ruled contrary to the general trend of invalidating genderbased retirement systems 92 by permitting a hospital to continue a policy of retiring men at sixty and women at fifty-five. 93 The court accepted the hospital's argument that the practice was reasonable
because women physically deteriorate faster than men. 94
The potential for anomolous results from the "unreasonable discrimination" standard as articulated in Sumitomo Cement, is also illustrated in Watanabe v. Furukawa Mining Co.95 In this case, the
plaintiff challenged the company's singling out of married women for
an economically necessitated lay-off. The Maebashi District Court
reasoned that the policy of laying off married women during a recession was reasonable because married female workers are best able to
bear the loss of a job.9 6 The court made this determination despite the

company's admission that it had not investigated the actual economic
circumstances of any of the women who were laid-off.97
As the Watanabe and Karatsu courts demonstrate, the danger
exists that a court will base its determination of whether a sex-based
employment practice is "reasonable" on very traditional attitudes
about gender roles. The extent to which the EEOA clarifies this ambiguous concept of discrimination as established by the Sumitomo Ce91. 881 HANJI 149 (Saga D. Ct. Nov. 8, 1977).
92. Important cases that have invalidated gender-based retirement systems as unreasonable discrimination include: Izu Cactus Park Case, 770 HANJI 18 (Tokyo High Ct. Feb. 26,
1975) (mandatory retirement of women at age 47 and men at age 57); Mitsui Shipbuilding
Case, 654 HANJI 29 (Osaka D. Ct. Dec. 10, 1971) (forced retirement for women at childbirth);
Tokyu Kikai Kogyo Case, 560 HANJI 23 (Tokyo D. Ct. July 1, 1969) (forced retirement of
women at age thirty); Onoda Cement Case, 523 HANJn 79 (Morioka D. Ct. Apr. 10, 1968)
(lay-offs focusing disproportionately on married women and women over thirty).
93. 881 HANJI 149 (Saga D. Ct. Nov. 8, 1977).
94. Id.
95. 21 ROSHO 1475 (Maebashi D. Ct. Nov. 5, 1970).
96. The court wrote that it "was obvious that the amount of damage to the interests of
married women with working husbands who resign and lose their salaries is generally less than
it would be in the case of other workers who would resign." Translated in Brown, supra note

68, at 43.
97. See Watanabe, 21 ROSH0 1475.
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ment line of cases is yet unclear. The employer guidelines in the
statute may potentially replace some of the subjectivity of the
Sumitomo Cement's reasonableness doctrine with definitive legal standards. The guidelines are not, however, in any way binding on the
courts, 98 and would only be authoritative in Article 90 litigation assuming that the courts accepted them as the controlling statements of
public policy in employment discrimination law.
Conversely, for the purpose of Article 90 litigation, the EEOA
could restrict or regulate the development of a definition for discrimination. Passage of the EEOA did not take away a female employee's
private right of action in areas that were formerly the subject of Article 90 litigation; namely, salary discrimination and retirement benefits. However, the question remains whether courts will extend the
Article 90 analysis to other conditions of employment encompassed
by the EEOA, such as recruitment and assignments. Because a system of non-binding arbitration enforces the guidelines in the statute, a
court may interpret the act as taking those practices covered by the
guidelines completely out of the realm of the court system. 99
The definition of discrimination that is being applied by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Mediation Commissions is also unclear. Because the commissions are composed of leading members of
the community who are not necessarily trained in law, 1°0 the
Sumitomo Cement doctrine may have little or no influence on the
compromises worked out by these commissions. In mediating disputes, the commissioners may rely more on their own attitudes of the
proper role of women in the work force than on the concept of discrimination that has developed through Article 90 litigation.101
Likewise, a clear and understandable definition of discrimination
also has not been established in the United States. Unlike the Japanese system, however, in which the determination of what constitutes
"unreasonable discrimination" can be reinterpreted on a case-by-case
basis by each court, the common law system of stare decisis allows
United States courts to look to prior decisions for general parameters
98. See generally UPHAM, supra note 3.
99. See UPHAM, supra note 3, at 154.
100. See generally Bergesen & Yamamoto Oba, supra note 11.
101. "If mediation commissioners disregard the law (the EEOA), their decisions will probably rest upon the customs and mores of Japanese society.... In addition, mediation commissioners are typically chosen from among the more prominent members of the community
(usually men), and their decisions or mediation plans tend to favor traditional institutions and
reflect conservative values." Id. at 882.
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of the word's meaning. The United States Supreme Court decisions
have been particularly important in establishing the principles behind
Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimination by definitively declaring a number of employment practices to be illegal.
For example, in the area of gender-based discrimination, the
Court has held that policies such as refusing to hire women with
young children, 10 2 requiring women to make larger contributions to
pension plans than men, 10 3 keeping women out of higher paying night
shifts, 10 4 and a variety of other gender-based employment practices,
are all invalid under the Act. The Supreme Court, however, has yet
to completely define the substantive reach of Title VII, and, thus,
many questions still remain about the precise scope of the term
"discrimination."
One of the principal sources of this uncertainty in defining discrimination under Title VII is the existence in American legal thought
of two competing models of equality. These models are the "equal
opportunity" model 0 5 and the "equal achievement" model. 1' 6 The
equal opportunity model discourages decisions based on discriminatory motives, and thus, focuses on the intent of the employer in making an employment decision. 01 7 The equal achievement model, on the
other hand, stresses that the problem of employment inequality is
based not only on individual discriminatory acts, but also on the general subordination of certain groups in society.1 o s This later model
analyzes the discriminatory effect as well as the discriminatory intent
on those groups.1'9 Title VII's broad prohibition against discrimination could encompass either of these theories and both theories have
influenced judicial interpretations of the statute. As a result, under
Title VII, both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects may
invalidate an employment practice.' 1 °
Uncertainties persist while American courts decide on how to
apply the "equal opportunity" and "equal achievement" models. A
recent example of such efforts is the 1988 Supreme Court case of Wat102. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
103. See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
104. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
105. This is also referred to as the "individual justice" model.
106. This is also referred to as the "group justice" model.
107. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models
of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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son v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.11 The issue facing the Court was
whether a completely subjective promotion system violated Title VII
solely because its effect was to promote white workers at a faster rate
than black workers.11 2 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's plurality opinion argued that, generally, proof of a discriminatory intent is required
to invalidate a promotion decision based entirely on subjective criteria.11 3 Evidence of discriminatory effect alone is sufficient only if the
1 14
plaintiff identifies specific criteria responsible for that effect.
The Watson holding was expanded by the Court the following
year in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 1 15 In this case, Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, stated that in all disparate impact
cases, the plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice that is
responsible for any statistical disparity.' 16 This element of the Wards
Cove decision was then partially restricted by section 105 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which states that if "the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment
practice." 17
As this brief summary of the recent development of disparate
impact analysis illustrates, the degree to which Title VII calls for
equal opportunity or equal achievement continues to be debated more
than twenty-five years after the passage of the statute. The firm establishment of disparate impact as a recognized theory for a Title VII
claim is a victory for the proponents of the equal achievement model.
However, through Watson and Wards Cove, opponents of that model
severely restricted the theory's use by procedural means. The future
of this conflict between the two models of equality should be centered
around the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
To the extent that effects alone are enough to invalidate an em111.

487 U.S. 977 (1988).

112.

Id.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 987.
115. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
116. In Wards Cove, the plaintiff alleged that several "objective" employment practices,
such as nepotism and separate hiring channels, as well as subjective decisionmaking, were
responsible for the disproportionately low number of non-whites in the better paying jobs at
the company. Id. at 647. Justice White wrote that to succeed, the plaintiff would have to show
that "each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites and non-whites." Id. at 657.
117. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, amended by 42 U.S.C. § 105

(1991).
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ployer's policy, the definition of discrimination in the United States
system differs greatly from Japan. For instance, in the course of developing the "unreasonable discrimination" standard under Article
90, Japanese courts have never suggested that equal achievement is a
goal of the law. Moreover the EEOA fails to change that position." 8
Thus, while employment discrimination law in both countries
lacks a clear definition of discrimination, the scope of the term is
broader in the United States than it is in Japan. For instance, Article
90 litigation in Japan has only been used to attack a limited number of
explicitly gender-based policies, primarily those concerned with retirement and benefit policies or practices that are on their face unequal. Title VII, on the other hand, has been used to invalidate
policies which have both the intent and effect of limiting women's role
in the labor market.
V.

CONCLUSION

The American legal system allows for more rapid social change
with regard to the alleviation of gender-based discrimination in employment than the Japanese system. American legal doctrine contains
a broader definition of discrimination and the legal processes for gender-based discrimination complaints are more advantageous for complainants. For instance, the United States system, through the
EEOC, creates a type of partnership between a private plaintiff and
the government to pursue employment discrimination claims against
employers. In contrast, the Japanese system, uses a more restrictive
definition of discrimination limits the possibility for rapid change by
emphasizing informal, case-by-case compromises. These differences
may be attributed to Americans' more progressive attitudes about
gender roles. However, such an explanation is not supported by the
history behind the enactment of Title VII.
As originally envisioned, Title VII was not an attempt to achieve
gender equality in the American work force. Like the rest of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VII was first and foremost about racial
equality. 119 In fact, Southern opponents of the bill proposed an
118. A linguistic argument has been made that the title of the EEOA carries in it a refutation of the concept of equality of achievement. The argument is that the word "kinto" was
chosen to be used in the law's title because it has the meaning of equal opportunity. In contrast, the other word that could have been chosen, "byodo," could mean equality in result. See
Edwards, supra note 4, at 243.
119. "The primary purpose of Title VII was to improve the economic status of blacks as a
group. Of all the civil rights legislation enacted prior to 1965, Title VII alone was aimed at the
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amendment adding the word "sex" to the list of protected classes one
day before the House vote. 120 The opponents, in an effort to stop Title
VII's passage, proposed the amendment because they believed that
gender-segregation was such a dominant part of the American labor
market that Congress would not be able to declare it illegal. Their
plan backfired, however, when the House a day later passed Title VII,
as amended. Apparently, many of the representatives who voted for
the bill believed that, even though gender had been added, Title VII
121
would not affect gender-segregated occupations.
Due to the statute's legislative history, it was originally uncertain
whether gender-based discrimination would be analyzed differently
than race discrimination.122 As late as 1974, a union accused of gender-based discrimination argued that principles developed in race discrimination cases were not necessarily applicable to gender-based
discrimination claims.1 23 The union's argument was rejected, and
thus ten years after the enactment of Title VII, the notion of a separate body of legal principles for gender-based discrimination was finally put to rest.
At the time of Title VII's passage, there was as little consensus
in the United States about the importance of gender equality in the
work force as there is presently in Japan. However, women workers
in the United States have been able to employ legislation that was
aimed primarily at combatting race discrimination to make important
strides against gender inequality in employment. Japanese women
have not enjoyed such good fortune.
1 24
Because of the relatively small number of minorities in Japan,
employment discrimination and gender-based discrimination are essentially one and the same issue. Thus, when Japanese legislators address of employment discrimination, they are aware that their actions
will most significantly affect women's roles in the work force. The
possibility is, therefore, remote that strong legal remedies inadvereconomic oppression of blacks." Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An
Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REv. 531, 538 (1981).
120. For a more complete discussion of the legislative history of Title VII, see Belton,
supra note 51, at 276.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 277.
123. Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
124. Racial minorities account for only 3-4% of the population in Japan. See M. Bronfenbrenner & Y. Yasuba, Economic Welfare in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: THE DoMESTIC TRANSFORMATION 110 (K. Yamnamura & Y. Yasuba eds., 1987).
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tently will be made available to women in Japan as they were by Title
VII in the United States.
Although working women in the United States, as compared to
Japan, possess stronger legal tools at their disposal to eradicate gender-based discrimination in employment, the wage statistics paper
suggest that the role of women in the labor markets of the two countries is quite similar.1 25 Undoubtedly, in both countries, the participation of women in the workforce may be increased by further
strengthening the legal sanctions against gender-based discrimination.
Achieving full equality of employment opportunity for women appears, however, to require more than simply improving women's legal
remedies. Fundamental changes in the division of domestic responsibilities, the structure of the work day, and the evaluation of women's
and men's services are necessary to meaningfully improve women's
1 26
position in the labor market.
Title VII has been in effect in the United States for more than
twenty-five years and American women still earn only sixty-five percent of men's wages. It is doubtful that Title VII will create more
significant changes during its next twenty-five years of existence.
Consequently, Japanese women, armed with a much weaker statute in
the EEOA, can gain little reassurance from the United States' example that their own equal employment legislation will improve their
situation substantially. The EEOA's record has not been impressive
thus far. For example, the year before the EEOA was enacted, there
were 140,000 women in managerial jobs in Japan. In 1990, five years
after the EEOA's enactioment, the number had risen to only
190,000.127

Thus, without fundamental social changes, it appears that

American and Japanese women entering the workforce today cannot
reasonably expect to see true equal employment opportunity during
their working lives.
125. See supra notes 105 and accompanying text.
126. For some interesting proposals for change in the United States, see Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986).
127. See Sanger, supra note 74, at AlO.

